Interpretation of the word “Supari” as a Fruit Product or Flavouring Agent

CITATION

PETITIONER: DINESHCHANDRA JAMNADAS GANDHI

       Vs

RESPONDENT: STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT- 17/01/1989

BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) MISRA RANGNATH (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA)

CITATION:  1989 AIR 1011, 1989 SCR (1) 138  1989 SCC (1) 420

ACT: Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954

Dineshchandra Jamnadas Gandhi v. State of Gujarat and another[1]

FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant is a tradesman carrying on business within the limits of Navsari Municipality. On 7.12.1978, the respondent, the food inspector of Navsari Municipality, purchased from the appellant 600 gins. of “Kesari colored sweet supari sali” and after complying with the procedural formalities packed and sealed the “supari” into three separate packages of 200 gins each and every one of them was sent to the Public Analyst who by his report dated 20.12.1978 (Ext. 12) affirmed that the sample contained a “yellow basic coal-tar dye” and that it did not conform to the standard laid down under the Rules. On 19.1.1979, the Food Inspector with the prior sanction of the District Health Officer, Valsad, filed a complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Valsad.

The appellant is a tradesman who operates inside the boundaries of the Navsari Municipality. Respondent, the Navsari Municipality’s food inspector, bought 600 gins of “Kesari colored sweet supari sali” from the appellant on 7.12.1978. After following all procedural procedures, he packed and sealed the “supari” into three separate packages, each containing 200 gins. One of the packages was sent to the Public Analyst, who confirmed in his report dated 20.12.1978 that the sample contained a “yellow basic coal-tar dye” and that it did not meet the standards established by the Rules. On January 19, 1979, the Food Inspector filed a complaint at the Valsad Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, having first received approval from the District Health Officer.

As mentioned, the prosecution resulted in a conviction and sentence imposed by the esteemed Chief Judicial Magistrate, which was then upheld by the High Court. The appellant is now attempting to challenge the validity of the verdict.

ISSUES
The legal issues raised in the statement by the Appellant’s Learned Counsel revolve around the interpretation and application of specific rules under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. Here are the legal issues:

1. Classification of “Supari” or “Betel-nut” as a Fruit-product:
   • The Appellant’s Counsel argues that “Supari” or “Betel-nut” is essentially a yield of the Areca-Palm and, therefore, should be classified as a “Fruit-product” under Rule 29(f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955.
   • The legal issue here involves determining whether “Supari” qualifies as a “Fruit-product” according to the specific criteria outlined in Rule 29(f).
2. Permissibility of Coal-tar Food Colors in “Supari” as a Fruit-product:
   • The Appellant contends that being classified as a “Fruit-product,” the use of permitted coal-tar food colors in “Supari” is not prohibited by law.
   • This raises the legal issue of whether the rules allow for the use of permitted coal-tar food colors in products classified as “Fruit products” and if there are any specific regulations governing such use.
3. Evaluation of the Prohibited Status of “Yellow basic coal-tar dye”:
   • The Appellant argues that the Public Analyst did not explicitly state that the “Yellow basic coal-tar dye” found in the sample is one of the food colors prohibited under Rule 28.
   • The legal issue involves determining whether the specific coal-tar dye found in the “Supari” falls under the category of prohibited food colors as per Rule 28.
4. Interpretation of Prohibition in the Context of “Fruit-products”:
   • The Appellant suggests that since “Supari” is considered a “Fruit-product,” the prohibition on the use of certain food colors may not apply.
   • This raises the legal issue of interpreting whether the prohibition on specific food colors, as outlined in Rule 28, applies uniformly to all food products, including those classified as “Fruit products.”

STATUTE AND PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Rule 23 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 expressly prohibits the addition of any coloring matter to a food item, except as explicitly authorized by the rules. Furthermore, Rule 28 prohibits the use of coal-tar food colors, except for those specifically listed, including ‘sun-set yellow FCF.’ However, even the coal-tar food colors permitted under Rule 28 are prohibited in or on any food, except for those explicitly mentioned in Rule 29. Notably, ‘Fruit-products’ constituted one such food item listed under Rule 29(f) at the relevant time. Offenders are subject to punishment under Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

ARGUMENTS INVOLVED

ARGUMENTS FROM THE SIDE OF THE PETITIONER

1. “Supari” Classification as “Fruit-product”:
   • Argument: Counsel asserts “Supari” from Areca-Palm falls under “Fruit-products” per Rule 29(f).
   • Legal Position: Allows the use of permitted coal-tar food colors in “Supari.”
2. Status of “Yellow basic coal-tar dye”:
   • Assertion: The analyst didn’t confirm the prohibition of “Yellow basic coal-tar dye” under Rule 28.
   • Implication: Justifies the dye’s use in “Supari” as a “Fruit-product.”
3. Bonafide Action and Benefit of Doubt:
   • Submission: The appellant acted bonafide, entitled to the benefit of the doubt.
   • Clarification: Even if “Supari” isn’t a “Food product,” the appellant’s reasonable view justifies the action.
4. Appendix ‘B’ Provision and Prohibition:
   • Argument: The absence of a provision in Appendix ‘B’ for “Supari” means coal-tar food-color use is prohibited.
   • Interpretation: Advocates a reasonably liberal construction of “Fruit-Products” in Rule 29(f) due to the penal nature of the legislation.
5. Liberal Construction of “Fruit-Products”:
   • Submission: “Fruit-Products” in Rule 29(f) should receive a reasonably liberal construction.
   • Context: A liberal interpretation considers “Supari” as reasonably falling under the category of “Fruit-Product.”

ARGUMENTS FROM THE SIDE OF RESPONDENT

1. Rule 23 – Prohibition on Colouring Matter:
   • Provision: Rule 23 prohibits adding any coloring matter to food unless specifically permitted.
2. Rule 28 – Restrictions on Coal-tar Food Colors:
   • Restriction: Rule 28 forbids the use of coal-tar food colors, except those explicitly listed, such as ‘Sun-set Yellow FCF.’
   • Presumption: Assumes the basic yellow coal-tar dye in “supari” is among the permitted colors.
3. Rule 29 – Prohibition on Coal-tar Food Colors in Certain Foods:
   • Limitation: Rule 29 prohibits using permitted coal-tar food colors in foods other than those specified in Rule 29.
   • Exception: “Fruit-Products” under Rule 29(f) can use permitted coal-tar food colors, subject to Appendix ‘B’ exceptions.
4. Nature of Offences under the ‘Act’:
   • Police Powers: Offenses under the ‘Act’ are acts prohibited by state police powers for public health.
   • Strict Statutory Offenses: Intent or mental state is irrelevant; backed by precedent (Goodfellow v. Johnson[2], Smedleys Limited v. Breed[3]).
5. Legislative Purpose and Social Defense:
   • Legislative Intent: Enacted to combat widespread food adulteration, a legislative measure for social defense.
   • Social and Economic Mischief: Aims to address the economic harm of poisoning food sources for monetary gain.
   • Construction: Advocates an interpretation aligning with social defense legislation, prioritizing the remedy for the mischief aimed at by the legislation.

JUDGEMENT

The court held that ‘Supari’ in the form in which it was offered for sale in the instant case though vegetative in origin and derived from and prepared out of the usufruct of areca palm, does not admit of being classified as a ‘Fruit product’ under Rule 29(1). Merely because a particular article of food was of plant origin did not render that article necessarily a ‘Fruit product’. Even products derived from, or associated in their origin with fruits need not ipso facto be ‘Fruit-products’ for purposes and within the meaning of Rule 29(1). ‘Supari’ also does not admit of being classified as a ‘flavouring agent’ under Rule 29(m).

The distinction between literal and legal meaning of statutory language lies at the heart of the problem of interpretation of statutes. The Court is not entitled to decline to determine the legal meaning of a statute on the principle of non-liquet. In the instant case, a wider construction of ‘Fruit-Products, which is in the nature of exception to Rule 29, results automatically in a corresponding narrower construction of the substantive provision in Rule 29. This is not a case of relieving provision excepting from the definition of an offence where the rule of construction against doubtful penalisation operates. The offence is really a violation of a prohibition imposed on a penalty as a social defence mechanism in a socio-economic legislation. The construction appropriate to such a legislation would be one which would suppress the mischief aimed at and advance the remedy. It would, therefore, be a strain on the statutory language and the statutory scheme to include ‘supari’ in the form in which it was sold, within ‘Fruit-products’ as understood in Rule 29.

The question of what a word means in its context within the Act is a question of legal interpretation and, therefore, one of law. The choice of the proper rule of construction to be applied to ascertain the meaning is again a matter of law.

To countenance the contention of the appellant that he had acted bona fide on a particular understanding of Rule 29(f) would be to contradict one of the fundamental postulates of a legal order that rules of law enforce objective meaning to be ascertained by the courts, and to substitute the opinion of the person charged with the breach of the law for the law itself. Otherwise, the consequence would be that whenever a defendant in a criminal case thought that the law was thus and so, he is to be treated as though the law was thus and so, that is, the law actually is thus and so.

The statute prescribes a strict liability without need to establish mens rea. The actus reus is itself an offence. There might be cases where some mental element might be a part of the actus reus itself. This is not one of those cases where anything more than the mere doing of the prescribed act requires to be proved. The appellant is, therefore, not entitled to the benefit of doubt.

The big offenders who manufactured the ‘supari’ and who distributed them to the retailer in the instant case have gone scot free. The offence was committed ten years ago and the appellate court had acquitted the appellant. Furthermore, the expression ‘Fruit-products’ in Rule 29(f) in the context of what the delegated legislative authority really meant and wanted to convey was not a model of precision and has since been deleted enumerating in its place precisely the specific products in which the food-colours permitted by Rule 28 could be used, leaving no room for the possibility of any argument of the kind advanced in this case. This is, therefore, a fit case in which the appropriate Government should exercise its executive powers of remission of the substantive sentence of imprisonment, though not of fine, under s. 432 Cr. P.C. or under other law appropriate to the case. The imposition of the substantive sentence of imprisonment on the appellant to be postponed till his prayer for remission, which he shall make, is considered and disposed of.

[1]DineshchandraJamnadas Gandhi v. State of Gujarat and another, [1989 (1) SCC  420 at p. 421]

[2] Good- fellow v. Johnson, [1965] 1 All E.R. 941 at 944

[3] Smedleys Limited v. Breed, [1974] All ER 21

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